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FAR EAST SURVEY 15 JANUARY 1953

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NORTH KOREA

Rhee Trip Engineered by U.S.: Pyongyang's lead in denouncing the visit of Syngman Rhee to Tokyo as part of the plot to extend the war is followed closely by both Peking and Moscow. The central theme that the Americans aim to extend the war, given prominence in Pyongyang broadcasts following Eisenhower's trip to Korea, is retained in comment on the Rhee trip, and all the threads of Communist argument are woven together to maintain the position that the Rhee visit, arranged by Eisenhower in December, is intended to result in South Korean concessions to the Japanese militarists which would permit the use of Japanese troops in the forthcoming U.N. offensive. The "imminent implementation" of the Eisenhower policy is said to be dependent upon the "dispatch of Japanese troops to the Korean front." particularly in view of the opposition to South Korea's present conscription policy which has made it impossible for Syngman Rhee to provide the promised manpower. Efforts are also allegedly being made by Rhee to gain Japanese cooperation for the mobilization of the Korean residents in Japan as cannonfodder for the coming offensive. Moscow comment on the Rhee visit, in addition to making similar charges, reports the pending formation of a Pacific alliance embracing South Korea, Japan, Taiwan, and the Philippines, as a result of the settlement of Japanese-Korean differences during the Rhee visit.

Praise of Harvests Repeated at Conference: The New Year occasions reviews of agricultural progress during the past year, with principal comment keyed to an advanced farmers' conference held from 5-8 January, and participated in by an unusual number of prominent officials including Kim Il Sung, Kim Doo Bong, Pak Hun Yong and Pak Chong Ai. The meeting occasioned widespread praise of the bumper harvests achieved in 1952 despite numerous difficulties, including the familiar shortages as well as the loss of power for irrigation facilities as a result of the American bombing of the Yalu power plants.

SOUTH KOREA

Anticipation of Decisive Military Action Reaches Peak: New Year broadcasts produce a spate of comment from Pusan to the effect that 1953 will see the final act in the unification of all Korea and the complete defeat of the Communists. This theme is prominent in all year-end reports of Government leaders, but President Rhee is most specific in reporting that "it should not be too long before the Eisenhower Administration takes decisive measures to bring about a quick solution of the Korean war, even if other UN members do not cooperate with the United States." He predicts, however, that should American plans be delayed, South Korea would march to the North, "alone, if necessary." Pyongyang avoids mention of this statement entirely, while Moscow reports it as evidence of the American desire to gain further profits by controlling the wolfram mines located in North Korea.

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THE KOREAN WAR

The New Year celebrations, which greatly reduce the volume of broadcast comment, also bring a partial relaxation of the virulent tone of Peking's anti-American propaganda. The following elements characterize comment during this SURVEY period:

- a. Almost half of all items are concerned with the military gains of the past twelve months, and with restating Communist ability to meet any future threat.
- b. There is general low-level repetition of former lines, including charges that BW is still being waged in Korea and China, that Pyongyang residential areas have again been subjected to indiscriminate bombings, and that continued U.N. violations of the Panmunjom area threaten to destroy the last chance for an equitable truce.
- Specific references to the repatriation issue are at the lowest point numerically since the beginning of the U.N. sessions, but there has been no indication of a softening of the Communist stand that all POWs must be returned.
- d. While Chinese broadcasts assail the aggressive purposes of the incoming administration, North Korean comment is much more pointed in its stress upon the imminence of a U.N. offensive and in its efforts to stiffen popular resistance by emphasizing American bestiality, the depraved conditions of the people in South Korea, and the fate that would await North Koreans should they permit the Americans to extend their present area of occupation.
- e. Peking belatedly echoes Moscow's line in qualifying Syngman Rhee's trip to Korea as a device intended to speed the use of Japanese and Japan-domiciled Koreans in the war. Some real anxiety over such a possibility seems indicated by Pyongyang's repeated insistence that no influx of Chiang, Japanese or Rhee troops can affect the situation on the front.

Korean War Made China a Modern Military Power: The New Year celebrations, which sharply reduce the general volume of Peking's broadcast propaganda, have brought an at least temporary abatement of the virulent tone noted subsequent to Eisenhower's trip to Korea. Almost half of all items broadcast in the first week of 1953 are specifically concerned with the achievements of the past twelve months, with stress upon: (a) the acquisition of modern equipment and the improvement of technical skill; (b) the attainment of rich combat experience by officers and personnel in mobile as well as positional warfare; (c) the erection of an impregnable defense; (d) the maintenance of high troop morale; and (e) the creation of an efficient supply and transportation system despite continual enemy harassment.

These accomplishments, Peking declares, have made China a modern military power capable of meeting any threat from the West.

This note is echoed in Pyongyang's recapitulation of the achievements of 1952 with the added statement that "the enemy despite his repeated defeats is still unable to learn the lesson of his failures and is preparing a new offensive. He should realize that any such ill-conceived adventure will bring his final doom."

Americans Continue BW, Indiscriminate Bombings, Truce Violations: Although comment on atrocities is much below recent high points, low-level attention to a wide variety of American crimes continues. Peking charges that bacteriological warfare is still being waged in North Korea and China, and relates this to the need for better sanitation measures and preventive care. Moscow, Peking, and Pyongyang have all assailed recent American bombings of Pyongyang in virtual concert, but with the difference that Moscow and Peking stress the absence of military targets in the capital city area, while Pyongyang merely charges that residential areas were the primary objective. Peking has made a great deal of recent U.N. violations of the truce zone's neutrality, describing them as an effort to destroy the last possible chance for an equitable truce.

POWS Ask Eisenhower to End Tensions by Total Repatriation: Although references to the prisoner-repatriation issue are at the lowest point numerically since the start of the U.N. sessions, there has been no tempering of Communist insistence that all POWs must be returned. Pyongyang, especially, continues to provide minute details of American maltreatment of internees as part of its concentrated effort to sharpen local hatred of the Americans. Prisoner-of-war messages broadcast from Peking continue to display vehement dissatisfaction with American POW policies, and 44 prisoners have allegedly appealed to the President-elect to end world tensions by agreeing to the repatriation of all prisoners and the conclusion of a five-power peace pact.

New U.N. Offensive Will Be Crushed: While Peking slackens its attacks on the aggressive purposes of the incoming administration, Pyongyang remains explicit in predicting that a U.N. offensive is imminent. In an apparent effort to bolster home-front morale while presenting a picture of what the people can expect should they permit the U.N. forces to expand their areas of occupation, North Korean broadcasts have reported the terrible conditions prevailing in the South, where poverty, slavery and death reign, and where Syngman Rhee's police are concerned only with terrorizing the population into subservience to American orders. While providing this awesome picture of confitions in the South, Pyongyang reveals its sensitivity to an expansion of the ROK forces by urging South Koreans to desert, to join the guerrillas, and to turn their guns on their military leaders.

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Use of Chiang, Japanese, Rhee Forces Cannot Affect War: Peking belatedly echoes Moscow's line in characterizing Syngman Rhee's trip to Korea as a chore imposed by his American masters to hasten the conscription of Japanese and Japan-domiciled Koreans for the war. That Pyongyang is really concerned over the possible implementation of such a plan is suggested by the studied effort to relate this plan to use "Asians against Asians" to the Americans' aggravated manpower shortage, and by the frequent allusions to Western press comment concerning the inability of Chiang, Japanese or additional Rhee forces to affect measurably the situation at the front. Peking, for its part, notes the desertion of 46,000 American troops, and recent admissions that even a limited offensive would mean 50,000 casualties.

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